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MYERS S. McDOUGAL
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
Political Asylum and Other Concerns: Some




Dean Beaney, Professor Nanda, other distinguished guests, students,
and friends. It is a distinct honor to give the fourteenth annual Myers S.
McDougal lecture at the University of Denver College of Law. Professor
McDougal's outstanding contributions to the teaching and study of inter-
national law are well known and too numerous to mention.' On a personal
note, I had the privilege long ago not only to meet Professor McDougal
but also to correspond with him about two individual chapters he and I
were furnishing for a book published in 1970, edited by Luis Kutner, enti-
tled The Human Right to Individual Freedom.
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II. PREFACE
We are living in a.very historic and challenging time in 1989 and
1990. Visualize 1917 when communism swept across Russia wiping out
the long-held laws, traditions, and customs of Imperial rule. The 1918
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk3 seemed to insure that the Russian Revolution
* Attorney, Denver, Colorado; Recipient of the Grand Order of Merit, Federal Republic
of Germany, 1935; Colorado College, B.A., 1937; Fellowship with the National Institute for
Public Affairs, 1937-38; University of Denver, J.D., 1941; Honorary L.LD from Colorado
College, University of Denver, and University of Colorado; Former Chair, Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission of the United States; Former Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme
Court.
1. Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University, in the tenth lecture in this series,
ably described some of Professor McDougal's work. See Falk, Accountability, Asylum, and
Sanctuary: Challenging Our Political and Legal Imagination, 16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
199 (1988).
2. See generally THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM- (L. Kutner ed. 1970).
3. See V. VALENTIN, THE GERMAN PEOPLE 567 (1946).
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would turn what has become the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics into
a difficult neighbor and state; one which would, and did, seek to impose
its imperialistic designs and international communism world-wide.
Now, almost seventy-three years later, we see the totalitarian society
envisioned by Marx and Engels, created by Lenin, and built into a reign
of terror by Stalin, changing drastically within. The communist system in
Russia has failed because it was not only economically unworkable but
also because of the denial of freedom and other basic human rights to its
citizens. The Gorbachev era of pragmatism, glasnost, and perstroika has
resulted in dramatic changes in both Russia and Eastern Europe. It may
also have helped to bring on, to some extent, the recent changes and
moves towards democratic societies in Nicaragua and South Africa, as
well as other political changes elsewhere in the world.
The failure of Russian Communism brings into focus the need for
states everywhere to begin anew the search to outlaw war and to make
the United Nations and its auxiliary organs (e.g., the International Court
of Justice) more effective and useful.
In spite of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the freedom granted East-
ern Europe, there is one factor which may determine whether the world's
rapidly evolving political changes will result in greater cooperation be-
tween the U.S.S.R. and other states in matters of world-wide concern.
That factor is whether the Western World will allow President Gorbachev
to deal, in his own way, with the question of freedom for the Baltic Re-
publics. I predict Gorbachev may find a practical solution if he is not
pushed too aggressively by the outside world. We should note that he has
apparently never said he will dismantle the U.S.S.R., agree to re-align the
German/Polish border, or grant complete independence to Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia, or Azerbaijan. Obvi-
ously, if the Gorbachev government grants freedom to one of the above
areas, similar concessions may have to be granted to the others. We can
all foresee the severe and perhaps unacceptable consequences to the Rus-
sian Empire if this occurs.
Caution, which has been followed by the Bush Administration to
date, may be the only way to proceed in the areas of disarmament and
diplomacy. Success in these negotiations may eventually help to achieve
greater peace and observances of human rights.
We should remember that the United Nations, in June 1945, suc-
ceeded the League of Nations. On a personal note, I have been involved
in studying world organizations since 1933. In September 1935 1 was priv-
ileged to be sitting in the League of Nations press box at the Geneva
sessions as a student reporter. I was present the day sanctions were voted
against Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia. 4 I witnessed Italy's Ambassador
walk out after the vote and only afterward fully realized its effect. In
4. This was approximately September 5, 1935.
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1945, while stationed in Oakland with the U.S. Army, I was privileged to
attend, as an observer, three important sessions of the founding of the
United Nations and to report on them to my General (over the years, I
have also attended several sessions of the U.N. in New York City).
Returning to the League of Nations, we should recall that before the
founding of the League in 1920, the world had previously had a Perma-
nent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"). It was created by the
Hague Conference of 1899, organized in 1900, and began operating in
1902. 5 The purpose of the court was to help states resolve primarily legal
and political disputes, and to serve the cause of world peace.
On May 17, 1920, the Council of the League of Nations, with the
powers conferred on it by statute, adopted a Resolution recreating the
above mentioned court. It also provided that non-member states could
utilize the court under certain conditions.' The Resolution was ratified
thereafter by a majority of the member states and became effective in
September 1921. This Court was available until 1946 when the Charter of
the United Nations created its own International Court of Justice
("ICJ").
The need for and effective use of the ICJ is more evident today than
in earlier times due to the present threat of nuclear disaster and the pos-
sibility of nuclear proliferation to small, hostile states. Additionally, the
evolution of a "one world" society makes the ICJ indispensable.
The development of international courts, over almost a century, re-
flects an attempt by the nations of the world to devise a workable system
to assist states in resolving disputes by using courts instead of war or
force.
Today, our planet has evolved into one world with mutual depen-
dence among all states. Most industrialized states realize that their sur-
vival depends, now more than ever before, on global cooperation to solve
common problems. They finally agree that we must prevent world-wide
pollution and try even harder to solve the racial, ethnic, sexual, political,
health, and economic problems which infect so much of our world. We
need only to read the daily newspapers to personally witness these con-
tinuing tragedies all around us.7
From our vantage point we can see why states have created a system
5. G. ELIAN, THE INTERNATIONAL'COURT OF JUSTICE 15-18 (1971).
6. M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE QUESTION OF
AMERICAN PARTICIPATION 364-65 (1925).
7. The frictions and problems of industrialized societies seem insignificant when com-
pared to those in other countries. No one person, government, or organization, even the
United Nations, seems able to stop environmental pollution world-wide or stop deforesta-
tion. Nor do any such entities seem able to help stabilize or reduce the violence and in some
cases the oppression in areas such as the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Burma,
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Northern Ireland, Columbia, and Peru. Nor,
at least up to this time, has the Western world been able to encourage and help China,
North Korea, and Libya to evolve into more humane societies.
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of diplomatic immunity and in some areas a recognized right of political
asylum. In the modern world, however, we apparently seldom, if ever, see
a legal "right" of sanctuary.
The processes of diplomatic immunity and political asylum for the
protection of individuals have remained even after development of the
PCIJ and the ICJ, which are for use only between states. The U.N. and
the Council of Europe with its headquarters in Strasbourg, have been in-
strumental in developing courts specifically designed to protect the indi-
vidual.' These have been working fairly well to date.
III. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Very few of the wide ranging and difficult international problems fac-
ing humanity and its governments today can be discussed in a single lec-
ture. One of particular interest to many lawyers and judges, however, is
how states function to meet the practical needs of their representatives
stationed abroad. The present solution to this problem is termed "diplo-
matic immunity."
This subject seems to be well understood in the international con-
text.9 It ranks among one of the most well established principles of inter-
national law. In large measure its principles are now codified in conven-
tional law.
The basic premise behind Diplomatic Immunity is that governments
have agreed to certain recognized rules and standards so that their repre-
sentatives in foreign lands can function efficiently and not be interfered
with or arrested. 10 In today's world, it is generally recognized that if dip-
lomats and their families commit felonies in the host country they may be
punished by the host's system of justice. Recent changes have occurred in
the U.S. to try to regulate, to some degree, misdemeanor offenses such as
parking tickets and uninsured motorist problems committed by foreign
diplomats and their families."
Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
12
declares that the premises of a diplomatic mission "shall be inviolable."
Similarly, article 29 pronounces the inviolability of a diplomatic agent.
More recently, the International Court of Justice unambiguously
stated, in a case involving the U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Te-
hran,13 that "there is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct
8. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(7).
9. See II C. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 97 (1973). The
chapter is entitled, "Immunities and Exceptions."
10. See also Falk, supra note 1, at 199-208.
11. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 946-47 (3d
ed. 1988).
12. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
13. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1979 I.C.J. 7.
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of relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys
and embassies.
14
Over two hundred years ago, these principles were recognized in one
of the earliest cases in U.S. history. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
"[t]he person of a public minister is sacred and inviolable. Whoever offers
any violence to him . . . is guilty of a crime against the whole world."15
The states of Latin America asserted at one time a regional custom under
which a right to grant asylum in the diplomatic premises would exist. The
existence of such a right was tested in the 1950 Asylum Case (Columbia
v. Peru).' 6 In this case the ICJ held that the Columbian government had
failed to prove the existence of such a regional custom of diplomatic asy-
lum. In response to the Court's decision, a new convention on asylum was
adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in 1954.11
IV. POLITICAL ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
"Political Asylum" is defined as the granting of protection to a refu-
gee from extradition by another state or states. Petition is made by the
refugee to the courts or executive branch of the receiving state for what
amounts to a form of sanctuary.
Most recently, President Bush "... issue[d an] executive order
[promising] to guarantee that Chinese students who fear for their safety
if they return home may remain in the United States."' 8
On a personal note, in 1971 I was the Chief Counsel for a Cuban
refugee with an American residency green card who was detained in what
was then British Honduras. Guatemala was seeking to extradite him on a
trumped up bank fraud charge. I drafted a lengthy "Petition for Political
Asylum" soon after arriving in Belize. I filed it both with the Trial Court
there and with the then British Governor General's office. With the help
of local counsel, the courts, and my trips to the United Nations in New
York, the British Foreign Office in London, and other contacts, I was
eventually successful in obtaining my client's full release after a year of
incarceration in a Belize jail. He is now an American citizen and a very
successful Florida businessman.
Political asylum is used quite often in international law to protect
basic human rights and is a necessary part of international law in a tur-
bulent world.
International terrorism - whether political, religious, or, at times,
state supported - is well known to all of us. It seems to be an endless
problem. We have the IRA in Northern Ireland, the now resolved U.S.
14. See id. at 19.
15. Republica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 116 (1784).
16. Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266.
17. See IV M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 436 (1968).
18. Bush to Allow Chinese Sanctuary, Den. Post, Apr. 7, 1990, at 7A, col. 4.
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hostage crises in Tehran, the present hostages in Beirut, the Libyan 9 and
Iranian Governments' support of terrorist groups and the Columbian
drug dealers, among others.
The Western World seems to be a particular target of this malaise.
Each government must try to resolve the violence and problems which
affect it as best it can; however, several multilateral treaties and agree-
ments have been executed between or among states to try to cope with
terrorism. It seems obvious that neither diplomatic immunity, political
asylum, nor any kind of protection should be granted to perpetrators and
their accomplices in this nefarious business.
When one thinks of what might be done to discourage international
terrorism and how the United States seeks foreign cooperation, two fairly
recent events come to mind. The first is the U.S. Congress' adoption of a
foreign criminal "long arm statute. '20 Using this statute, prosecutors can
seek extradition of persons charged with harming U.S. nationals outside
our borders, or of those who commit drug offenses contrary to our laws.
The well known murder case of an American by foreign terrorists on the
steamship Achille Lauro and the more recent fatal bombing of a Pan-Am
flight from Frankfurt to the United States are examples of situations in
which the new statute might be used.
Time will tell whether we are successful in attempting to extradite
some of those arrested in other countries for these and similar crimes.
One difficulty the United States faces in seeking extradition in such cases
is that we have both federal and state death penalty laws, which our sys-
tem believes to be necessary. Conversely, countries such as Germany
(where an alleged illegal bomber was arrested) do not allow capital pun-
ishment. Courts in countries without a death penalty object to extradi-
tions if the accused could suffer the death penalty.'
It should be pointed out that the U.S. has not always been entirely
circumspect about forcing foreign nationals (many of whom have never
been in the U.S.) to our shores and before our courts. Federal courts have
long condoned what they call "abductions" (but which to some others
appear to be out-right "kidnapping" punishable by our laws) to bring
such persons before our courts to be tried." The most recent example of
this type of operation is the abduction of Panamanian dictator Manuel
Noriega. s
The question naturally arises whether the United States or any coun-
19. See Goldberg, The Shoot-Out at the Libyan Self-Styled Peoples Bureau: A Case of
State Supported International Terrorism, 30 S.D.L. REV. 1 (1984).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
21. Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F. Supp. 988, 993 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See also Note,
The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986: Faulty Drafting May
Defeat Efforts to Bring Terrorists to Justice, 21 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 127, 132 (1988).
22. People v. Pagan, 377 N.Y.S. 2d 420 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Rubin, Is Noriega Worth Subverting U.S. Law, Christ. Sci. Mon., Mar. 19,
1990, at 18, col. 1.
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try has or, should have, a legal right to unilaterally "abduct" foreigners
from other countries in order to bring them to "justice." I submit that no
government has an inherent right to kidnap people, and that other ways
should be devised to accomplish the desired end, (i.e., through multilat-
eral and mutually beneficial treaties or agreements).
In the case of General Noriega, one newspaper reported that he was
charged with several criminal violations under our federal statutes.24
Since he is a Panamanian national and former Panamanian official, and
he was seized in Panama and forcibly brought to the United States, we
can assume these issues will be decided in the federal court in Florida
where he is to be tried. In view of prior federal court rulings, the predict-
able result of the abduction defense is foreseeable.
Referring for a moment to my earlier remarks on diplomatic immu-
nity, it appears that the problem faced by the United States in obtaining
custody of Noriega in Panama has another interesting dimension. He
claims he chose not to surrender willingly during or after the U.S. mili-
tary invasion of his country because there was no formal declaration of
war against Panama. It is interesting to note that one of Noriega's de-
fenses is that he is a "prisoner of war."25 This is because he was captured
as a result of the American military invasion. The U.S. invasion at the
time was criticized by an overwhelming majority of the U.N. General As-
sembly and objected to by Columbia and Peru as being in violation of the
O.A.S. Treaty prohibiting such action.2" The conduct of the United States
may be a substantive defense for Noriega since it apparently violated
both conventional and customary international law. It also demonstrates,
once again, that major powers, when it suits their objectives, may apply
the old adage that "might makes right." Another defense Noriega might
raise is whether the United States action against Panama was a violation
of the new United States-Panama Canal Treaty and the Charter of the
O.A.S.2 7
24. See Noriega Expected in Court Today, Den. Post, Jan. 4, 1990, at 11A, col. 1.
These charges included accepting $46 million in bribes from drug traffickers; allowing Pan-
ama to be used as a drug relay station; using political power to protect drug traffickers;
laundering drug money in Panamanian banks; and three counts relating to marijuana.
25. Noriega's Surrender, Newsweek, Jan. 15, 1990, at 15.
26. See Nanda, The Validity of the United States Intervention in Panama Under In-
ternational Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1990). The U.N. General Assembly is quoted as
stating, the invasion was "a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states." U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/240, 29 Dec. 1989. See
also N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, at A9, col. 5.
27. Professor Ved Nanda, in his article, quotes the O.A.S. charter, article 18 which
reads:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any form of
interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic, and cultural elements.
Nanda, supra note 26, at 495.
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The undeclared invasion resulted in the reported deaths of 23 U.S.
military personnel and of an estimated 300 Panamanian civilians.2 8 As a
result, the U.S. government is faced with an estimated cost of hundreds
of millions of dollars, not only to repair the damage from the invasion but
to help the Panamanian economy back on its feet.2 9 The cost of repair is
due not only to the U.S. military invasion but also to a deteriorating
economy which is the result of our long-time trade embargo.
Even though there exists a "long enjoyed practice by states of hu-
manitarian intervention or the protection of a state's nationals and some-
times others .... ,"o it seems that the United States government's reli-
ance on this principal is very weak. News accounts prior to the attack
reported that one U.S. national had been killed and that there was at
least one other violent episode involving an American citizen. Those
"provocations" (if these were sufficient) become de minimis in light of the
fact that the U.S. government had previously executed treaties stating
that it would not take any military action against Panama. It then be-
comes a question of degree as to how bad a situation would have to be
before the use of the humanitarian intervention doctrine becomes legal.
Even if the above doctrine applies in this situation (which I do not
believe it does), the question remains whether the invasion was legal
under the U.N. Charter, other treaties, and international law. An addi-
tional question exists regarding the position of a person such as Noriega
who properly seeks and obtains, in his own country, political asylum in a
third country's diplomatic embassy. Does an invading government (spe-
cifically the United States) have any legal right to act as the U.S. did to
force a wanted person to abandon his sanctuary? And, is forcing him out
of his sanctuary a rejection of the recognized law of political asylum?
In Panama, after Noriega fled for protection to the Embassy of the
Papal Nuncio, the United States military surrounded that embassy with a
fleet of armored vehicles, tanks, and armed soldiers, stopping, question-
ing, and apparently searching persons entering or leaving the embassy.
The U.S. Military also played blaring rock-and-roll music twenty-four
hours a day to try to break the refugee's resolve and sanity and to force
him to surrender. This conduct was well beyond the norms of present
recognized international law.
Article 20 states in pertinent part that the territory of a member state "may not be the
object, even temporarily, of military occupation" or any other use of force. Article 21 pro-
vides, "[t]he American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have
recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance with existing
treaties or in fulfillment thereof."
28. A Standoff in Panama, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 8, 1990, at 28.
29. Panama Death Toll Eludes Officials, Den. Post, Jan. 10, 1990, at 4A, col. 1.
30. See McDougal, Law and Peace, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 21 (1989). In this schol-
arly article, Professor Myers S. McDougal discussed humanitarian intervention. He also
thoroughly analyzed today's need for a community of international, governmental, and other
groups which would assist humanity to transcend national boundaries to make this a more
peaceful, humane, and workable world.
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By comparison, the actions of the communist government in Buda-
pest in 1956 in the case of Cardinal Mindszenty were quite inapposite.
Mindszenty took refuge in the United States embassy to escape the wrath
of the communist government after the Soviet Union and some of its
Warsaw Pact allies invaded Hungary." Our government protected him
there for fifteen years until a negotiated release allowed him to fly safely
to freedom in Rome where he died four years later.3 2 I do not recall any
conduct on the part of the government of Hungary against Mindszenty or
our embassy in 1956 or later, comparable to our actions in 1990 against
the Papal Nuncio and his embassy in Panama.
A second case for comparison involved the Chinese government fol-
lowing the Chinese army's assault of June 1989 in Tiananmen Square. At
that time the prominent Chinese astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, who disap-
proved of the use of force by his government and favored a continued
loosening of political restrictions in China, fled with his wife to the
United States Embassy in Beijing for safety. 3 There was no direct har-
assment of these two refugees reported in news accounts, but there was at
least one incident when a few Chinese soldiers fired into a nearby non-
embassy owned apartment building. Also, there were the "to be expected"
searches and restrictions at the embassy entrance gate. News reports up
to now, however, indicate that the Chinese government has not sought to
force the refugees out by any such extraordinary methods as those used
by the United States Government against General Noriega in Panama.
Each of us can draw our own conclusions as to the legality under interna-
tional law, as well as the morality, of the comparisons recited above.
V. SANCTUARY
Another concern of many people today is the purported right of sanc-
tuary, usually meaning church or church related protection.
Sanctuary was an ancient right of protection against secular power. It
was given to certain individuals by some ancient cities and later by some
religious orders using their churches for that purpose.3 4 Today "sanctu-
ary" is defined in Webster's New Universal Dictionary as:
1. A holding place; a building or place set aside for worship of a god or
gods; ....
2. A place of refuge or protection; originally fugitives from justice were
immune from arrest in churches or other sacred places.
3. Refuge or protection; immunity from punishment or the law, as by
taking refuge in a church, etc.38
31. See Whitemen, supra note 17, at 463-64.
32. Noriega's Move Puzzle for Church, Chi. Tribune, Dec. 29, 1989, at 10, col. C.
33. Kyodo News Service, Jan. 2, 1990.
34. See Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age Old Right or a Dangerous Misin-
terpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747 (1986).
35. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1603 (2d ed. 1979).
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Sanctuary continued and was recognized in some nations of the
Western world until the sixteenth century. 6 A period of steep decline be-
gan in England under King Henry VIII. 7 By 1624 the few remaining En-
glish general church sanctuaries were abolished. Canon law apparently
also abandoned its recognition of sanctuary long ago. In recent times
there has been no mention of sanctuary in the newly revised 1983 Code of
Canon Law. The Code dropped its previous statement that a "church en-
joys the right of asylum so that weak criminals who flee to it are not to be
removed from it except in case of necessity, without the assent of the
ordinary or the rector of the church."3
One recent article points out that the right of sanctuary historically
only applied to various types of wrongdoers such as persons accused of
crimes or debtors. 9 Political refugees were not included. Also, persons in
England who were in a sanctuary could not stay permanently and were
soon forced out one way or another.
Apparently, all or most of the refugees coming to the United States
in recent years from El Salvador and Nicaragua have been fleeing from
either political unrest or war. Those from Guatemala and Haiti have been
fleeing from upheavals of one kind or another.40 Some allegedly have also
come seeking a better economic life.
When one measures their reasons for seeking sanctuary against the
qualifications for sanctuary before it was abolished in England centuries
ago, it is readily apparent that, then and now, they would not qualify
since they do not claim to be criminals or debtors.
Also, when one considers that political refugees were not specifically
included in the English sanctuary laws, it seems that even those who can
prove "persecution" or "a well-founded fear of persecution" should seek
relief in the courts or through the executive .branch for political asylum
and not under a church's claim of sanctuary.4
For various reasons most refugees seeking sanctuary in our country
have not succeeded. This is not surprising considering that they cannot
show a "clear probability of persecution" once they are returned. Our
courts have recognized that the ancient law of sanctuary does not exist in
the United States.
One authority concluded that leaders of the claim to sanctuary for
Central American refugees have admittedly promoted "a myth or fable"
in order to change the present foreign policy of the United Sates towards
36. Carro, supra note 34, at 766.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 767.
39. See id.
40. U.S. Biased on Asylum Amnesty Group Claims, Den. Post, Mar. 29, 1990, at 6A,
col. 1.
41. See U.S. v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
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El Salvador and Nicaragua.' 2
In spite of the federal court rulings and the legal fact that the old
English laws of sanctuary were discarded long ago, it is reported that to-
day about 400 churches and synagogues are attempting to grant sanctu-
ary in the United States.' Their food, housing, and relief assistance to
refugees are commendable. Their attempts to protect refugee aliens from
being deported according to our laws, however, appear to be of doubtful
value in view of the federal government's constitutional and statutory
right to regulate and control aliens.
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONNALLY
AMENDMENT
It is common knowledge that the International Court of Justice is an
arm of the United Nations." Over twenty years ago a debate ensued in
the United States Senate when the American Bar Association ("ABA")
and other organizations and groups sought to have the Connally Amend-
ment repealed. This amendment was added by the Senate as a condition
of the U.S.'s acceptance of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction. I was one of
those assisting the ABA in the endeavor to repeal the amendment.
The Connally Amendment is still relevant to discussions of the ICJ
because, even though it was repealed by the Senate, President Reagan
saw fit to re-institute it as an executive act. The President did not want
the U.S. to appear before the ICJ when Nicaragua sued the United States
for mining its harbors even though no state of official war existed between
the two countries.
Here is a brief history of what transpired with the amendment. The
first U.S. declaration of adherence stated:
This declaration shall not apply to . . .(b) Disputes with regard to
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States of America as determined by the United States of
America."6
It was these underscored words which were stricken once the U.S. govern-
ment later agreed to accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
If the Connally Amendment were omitted, the relevant parts of the
United States' declaration would read:'
6
42. Carro, supra note 34, at 769 (quoting the Chairperson of the Cincinnati Coalition
for Public Sanctuary).
43. Transcript of "The Today Show," Mar. 23, 1990, interview with a Catholic church
worker by Bryant Gumbel (available upon request from the National Broadcasting Com-
pany, New York).
44. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 92.
45. DUKE LAW SCHOOL WORLD RULE OF LAW BOOKLzT SERIES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
ON THE WORLD COURT AND THE UNITED STATES (emphasis added)[hereinafter QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS].
46. Id. at 5-6.
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A. The United States of America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Jus-
tice in all legal disputes hereafter arising concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of
an international obligation;
Provided further, that this declaration shall remain in force for a pe-
riod of five years and thereafter until the expiration of six months
after notice may be given to terminate this declaration.4
There are two main effects of the Connally Amendment. First, the
United States can prevent adjudication in any case brought against it
under this Declaration by stating that, in the opinion of the United
States, the matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. Second,
because of the principle of reciprocity, any other country can similarly
prevent adjudication in any case brought by the United States by stating
that, in that country's opinion, the matter is essentially within its domes-
tic jurisdiction.'
8
The difficulty with the first point is that it is not a complete answer
to what happens if a case is brought against the U.S., and our government
were to say that, in its opinion, the matter "is essentially within its do-
mestic jurisdiction." Under well established principles of international
law, the ICJ is the authority which must determine jurisdictional facts,
not the United States Government. This is certainly true here since the
U.S. expressly gave up the right to self determination when the Connally
Amendment's wording was later stricken.
The ICJ itself held in the case of France v. Norway, that an instru-
ment in which a party is entitled to determine the existence of its obliga-
tion is not a valid and enforceable instrument of which a court of law can
take cognizance.41
Arthur Larson, who compiled the Duke University pamphlet cited
above, lists numerous domestic issues involving the United States that
could have both a national and international effect, but which clearly
would remain solely under domestic jurisdiction.
After the filing of the suit against the U.S. by Nicaragua, the United
47. Declaration of the United States of America Recognizing as Compulsory the Juris-
diction of the Court, in Conformity with art. 36, V L, of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, August 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 61 Stat. 1218, 1 U.N.T.S. 9.
48. See Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway) 1957 I.C.J. 9.
49. Id. at 48.
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States announced, "it will not accept the forum's jurisdiction in Central
American disputes for two years."50 The reason given was that the United
States was financing and waging an undeclared war against Nicaragua
and also was financing and supplying the Contras when it mined Nicara-
gua's harbors to interfere with its shipping and movement of goods and
equipment.
As the lawsuit progressed, the U.S. Administration formulated a res-
olution that it, ". . . will formally cease to recognize the authority of the
World Court except in non-political cases . . . ."5 Washington officials
were also quoted as saying the U.S. would, "continue to deal with the
Court on 'mutually submitted' disputes involving legal or border
problems with other nations." 2
The United States did not defend itself in this suit, and conse-
quently, the Court held that the U.S.'s activities constituted illegal inter-
vention." The Court further ruled that the United States is under an
obligation to make reparations to Nicaragua for damages caused by U.S.
activities."
There were many organizations and people who objected to the
United States' position. For example, the Boston Bar Association passed
a resolution condemning our government for not abiding by its agreement
to accept compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
55
There are other fairly recent instances of the United States choosing
to act unilaterally and militarily against other countries, whenever the
administration in power deemed it to be in its best interests. The military
invasion of Grenada and the bombing of Libya are two examples. Each of
us can judge for ourselves what opinion the world will hold of us and our
government when it acts alone, as it did in Panama in December 1989. I
submit that one of the best courses to pursue for a more peaceful world,
obviously, is mutual cooperation of states to strengthen world organiza-
tions as much as possible, no matter how difficult the road may be. We, as
people who live in representative democracies, must acknowledge that it
is very difficult for our governments to try to reason and deal with the
Castros, the Khadafys, the Khomeinis, and other dictatorial governments
in order to solve world problems.
VII. CONCLUSION
The challenges are vast indeed. Dramatic current political, social,
50. U.S. Rejects World Court in Latin Role, Den. Post, Apr. 9, 1984, at 1A, col. 3.
51. U.S. to Cease Recognizing Authority of World Court in Political Matters, Den.
Post, Oct. 7, 1985, at 8A, col. 1.
52. Id.
53. World Court Brands U.S. Contras' Support as Violation of Law, Den. Post, June
28, 1986, at 3A, col. 1.
54. Id.
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and territorial changes have been occurring almost daily since the Fall of
1989. Many of these changes demonstrate humanity's often thwarted but
constant search for political as well as economic freedom, justice, and
human dignity. Perhaps new governments - with the assistance of freed
citizens voting and working in harmony - can move our planet along the
road to a better world environment for humanity everywhere. We know
the road ahead is still fraught with pitfalls and dangers. Yet lawyers,
judges, public representatives, and government bureaucrats can do much
to alleviate injustice and to move the process along.
At this time, I suggest we need to continue to widen and more effec-
tively work in several areas:
1. Diplomatic Immunity. This is one of the most important fields of
cooperation and should be used continuously to help governments func-
tion better externally.
2. Political Sanctuary. This should be granted whenever possible to
relieve the suffering and distress of many politically threatened people.
3. Hostage Taking. This practice is reprehensible to all decent peo-
ple. Many countries are actively participating in attempts to stop this
practice and to obtain the release of those now being held. These efforts
should be continued. The international legal cooperation which at times
leads to the extradition of terrorists, bombers, and drug growers and deal-
ers should also continue.
4. Environmental and Other Concerns. Many states are joining in an
effort to protect our mutual environment and to place restrictions on the
uses and depletions that are destroying it. All governments should be
urged and enticed into joining in this necessary effort. All governments
should assist actively in human rights causes. We also see some interna-
tional efforts to deter and prevent money laundering and to open secret
bank accounts.
5. Unrest and Violence. With the existence of widespread racial, eth-
nic, and religious violence and hatred, I suggest states should also more
actively support the United Nations Charter in trying to abolish violence
and war and to help the U.N. enforce the Charter's mandate that terri-
tory taken by force cannot be retained. I submit U.N. member states
should also consider a Charter amendment to assure a timetable that will
reasonably provide for the prompt return of territory conquered by an
invader, or taken from affected inhabitants of an area by a defending
state. In addition, lawyers on a personal basis should cooperate with non-
militant religious leaders as well as fraternal and civic organizations on
ethical and public issues to help sustain the fabric of democracy
everywhere.
6. International Court of Justice. It seems appropriate for lawyers
and judges to urge, whenever ethically possible, that all United Nations
members must accept compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Further, ways
should be sought to obtain some limited power for that Court, in addition
to the force of public opinion, to enforce its judgments, decrees, and
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orders.
In summary, we should encourage lawyers and judges everywhere to
be leaders, as many are, in urging action in appropriate fields and in as-
sisting their respective governments in solving public problems. In addi-
tion we should seek better usage of the ICJ. There is a real danger that if
we, who see the challenges our societies and the environment face in this
period of drastic change, do not grasp the nettle and try to see to it that
our societies and governments move ahead rapidly, humanity may lose its
current opportunity to make the world safe for democracy, as well as to
maintain this as a liveable place for humanity.
In 1968, Denna Frank Fleming, who was then Emeritus Professor of
International Relations at Vanderbilt University, recited some pertinent
thoughts and made some predictions which seem even more timely
today.56
He first quoted President Woodrow Wilson's speech in St. Louis re-
garding what Wilson called the "betrayal" of our government when the
Senate failed to ratify the League of Nations Treaty following World War
I.
Wilson said he felt as if he now should have, "... the boys, who went
across the water to fight. . ." called together and tell them what he
had said before they went, that World War I was a "war against wars"
and he had done his best to fulfill that promise. But now he had failed
and because of that failure, "there will come some time ... another
struggle in which not a few hundred thousand fine men from America
will have to die but as many millions as are necessary to accomplish
the final freedom of the peoples of the world."67
Wilson was certainly prophetic as to another major war coming,
namely World War II. Fortunately, he was not correct as to the number
of American lives lost in that war, for it was not in the millions. He was
accurate, however, in predicting that millions of lives would be lost when
one thinks of the 60 to 70 million in all who died as a result of that terri-
ble war. Professor Fleming went on to point out that "our people knew in
1918 and 1919 what should be done, but not enough of them insisted on
its being done. ' 58 This was after the United States Senate refused to rat-
ify the League Treaty. He also stated that, "[w]e do not know what the
full outlines of the coming world order will be, but we know that it must
come, since life is no longer tolerable without it .... If this war has done
nothing else it has shattered the myth of national sovereignty. 59 He fur-
ther stated:
"In these deadly years the alert citizens of every nation have discov-
ered that the nation is not enough, that to live tolerably they must
56. SEE D. FLEMING, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT, 1920-1966 (1968).
57. Id. at 161.
58. Id. at 185.
59. Id.
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have something more - a higher level of protection, to which they
must yield a fraction of their sovereignty in order to keep the bulk of
it, the precious essentials of ordinary self-government. Thus the
United Nations is not something imposed on us, but something we
seek and are glad to give loyalty to, a loyalty which will deepen and
dignify our national patriotism, such as the latter makes fruitful and
productive our local patriotism. We add a level of government to pre-
serve all the others, not to weaken or destroy them."'
Further, he observed that "[n]o voice is raised against the Permanent
Court of International Justice." He quotes from Attorney General Homer
H. Cummings saying in 1934 that ". .. in the fullness of time the World
Court is destined to become the most useful, the most majestic tribunal
in all the history of the human race .... A strong, working organization
of the nations can be postponed again until after a Third World War - if
there is then anything left to organize." '
All knowledgeable people everywhere surely realize how prophetic
the last statement is when they stop to think what would happen in the
event of a nuclear holocaust. They should also agree that it is up to them
to see to it that it does not happen.
60. Id. at 186.
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